



VICTORIA JUNIOR COLLEGE
JC2 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 2018
HIGHER 2

H2 History

9752/01

Paper 1 Shaping the International Order (1945-2000)

11 September 2018
3 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

Write your class, index number and name on all the work you hand in.
Write in dark blue or black pen on both sides of the paper.
You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.
Do not use staples, paper clips, glue or correction fluid/tape.

Section A

Answer **Question 1**.

Section B

Answer **two** questions.

At the end of the examination, fasten and submit your work for Section A and Section B separately.

Ensure that your work is fastened securely.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.

This document consists of **5** printed pages.

[Turn over

Section A

You **must** answer Question 1.

END OF THE COLD WAR

1 Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

Interviewer: When people look back at this era, what lessons are they going to take from it?

Forsberg: We began the decade with an administration that was uninterested in arms control and adamant about not talking to the Soviets. We're ending the decade with an administration which is not only talking to the Soviets, but has concluded the first treaty that is going to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons. What happened between 1981 and 1988 was the nuclear freeze movement. The other remarkable thing is that the nuclear freeze movement was at its height when we were at the worst of the Reagan rhetoric against the Soviet Union. And as the nuclear freeze movement became demoralized and stopped being publicly active, that was when the Reagan Administration started reacting and showing the impact of the anti-nuclear movement, going back to the bargaining table with the Soviets, concluding that it was not possible to come out successfully with a legacy, or as a Republican Party going into a new presidential election, without an arms control agreement.

Interview with Randall Forsberg, founder of the Nuclear Freeze movement in America, 1987.

Source B



A cartoon published in an American newspaper, 29 November 1987.

Source C

As long as the gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. The Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? [...] There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace.

General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!

Ronald Reagan giving a speech in Berlin, 12 June 1987.

Source D

For 45 years we have been managing to avoid a big war. This says that not everything was bad in the past. Nevertheless, one conclusion is obvious - the reliance on force, on military superiority and the arms race, did not withstand the test. And our two countries seem to realize it better than anyone else. To no avail was the ideological confrontation which kept us busy maligning each other. We reached a dangerous brink. And it is good that we managed to stop. It is good that mutual trust emerged between our two countries. And common people realized this, perhaps even better. People simply interfere into policy making. Ecological problems, bad consequences of technological progress. All this is understandable, essentially this is a question of survival. And this kind of public mood is strongly affecting us, politicians.

Cold War methods, methods of confrontation suffered a strategic defeat. Therefore, we together can do a lot on this stage to change radically our old approaches. We had already felt it in our contacts with the Reagan administration. And this process continues today.

Gorbachev's remarks to Bush during the Malta Summit, 2 December 1989.

Source E

The communist system was especially unfit for the Polish people and the Pope allowed us to see how many of us there were. He awoke the Polish people. [...] The Soviets realized that the communist system needed some reform and that guy was appointed as leader of the Soviet Union, this past secretary of the Communist Party. We knew perfectly well that the communist system was not reformable. That's why we kept encouraging him. Go on, we would say, and we were waiting for him to pull out one brick so that the whole structure would collapse. And this is exactly what happened. So if any one of you wanted to assess in percentage who contributed to what extent, we would have to give 50 percent of credit for bringing communism down to the Pope, 30 percent to Solidarity and Lech Walesa, that means myself. I do not speak about obvious factors, as had it not been for your great leader, President Ronald Reagan, the end of communism would not have been so easy. But their contribution can be seen in a different perspective because we did the physical job, the direct job.

Excerpt from a public lecture by Lech Walesa, former President of Poland, at Kansas State University, 13 April 2006.

Source F

The road to 1989-91 was prepared by the less visible, often marginal, but critically significant in the long run, workings of what we call now civil society (Solidarity in Poland, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia). They were more than simple revolts because they attacked the very foundations of the existing systems.

Once ideology ceased to be an inspiring force, here we see the role of the Gorbachev effect. A former Charter 77 spokesperson confirmed to me that Gorbachev's new thinking was perceived by the Chartists as a necessary condition for major change in east central Europe. [...] Gorbachev acknowledged that, unless force was used, the Leninist system could not be preserved in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact: unlike all his predecessors, he refused to resort to tanks. Gorbachev fundamentally changed the rules of the game. Thanks to the 'new foreign policy thinking', the possibilities for political experimentation in east central Europe and in the former USSR expanded dramatically.

Article by a Romanian historian in an academic journal, 2009.

Now answer the following questions:

- (a) Compare and contrast the evidence provided in Sources C and D on superpower relations. [10]
- (b) How far do Sources A-F support the view that the end of the Cold War was mainly brought about by popular movements? [30]

Section B

You must answer **two** questions from this section.

EITHER

- 2 Assess the role of Western Europe and Japan in the liberalisation of the global economy after World War II.

[30]

OR

- 3 'South Korea's economic transformation from 1970 to 1990 was contingent on international developments.' How far do you agree?

[30]

AND EITHER

- 4 'The success of the United Nations in safeguarding international law was dependent on the work of the International Court of Justice.' How far do you agree?

[30]

OR

- 5 'The United Nations was not adequately prepared for the challenges of the post-Cold War world.' Discuss.

[30]